We report our findings on the properties of Flagg and Friedman's translation from Epistemic into Intuitionistic logic, which was proposed as the basis of a comprehensive proof method for the faithfulness of the Gödel translation. We focus on the propositional case and raise the issue of the admissibility of the translated necessitation rule. Then, we contribute to Flagg and Friedman's program by giving an explicit proof of the soundness of their translation.
Introduction
In their work Epistemic and Intuitionistic Formal Systems (1986), Flagg and Friedman gave a new proof-as an alternative to Goodman's [1] -for the faithfulness of the Gödel translation (·)
T from intuitionistic logic into epistemic modal logic S4 once (·)
T is applied to Heyting arithmetic. They aimed at a comprehensive proof method, to be deployed not only for arithmetic but for various formal systems whose intuitionistic and epistemic versions are connected by a faithful translation:
for any intuitionistic formula A. To this end, they proposed a class of embeddings of epistemic into intuitionistic logic, which are, in a certain sense, inverse to (·) T . In order to prove the faithfulness of the Gödel translation, Flagg and Friedman claim that their translation
where Γ is an arbitrary set of intuitionistic formulae and E is a chosen formula from Γ. In this article we discuss some issues about the proof of soundness of the generic Flagg-and-Friedman translation (·) (E) Γ from Epistemic Propositional logic, shortly EP (i.e. the modal logic S4), into Intuitionistic Propositional logic, IP.
Let Γ = ∅ be a finite set of IP-formulae and E ∈ Γ. Then, for each formula A in EP, Flagg and Friedman define the formula A (E) Γ of IP (simply denoted by A (E) when this is not ambiguous) as follows 2 , recursively on the structure 3 of A :
Their basic result is the following theorem (Th. 1.8 in [2] ), which states the soundness of their translation in propositional calculus.
then, for any finite set Γ of IP-formulae and for any E ∈ Γ,
The authors suggest to prove Theorem 1 by induction on the length of derivations, but do not give enough details for a straightforward proof. In fact, a plain and standard induction on the length of derivations would presuppose that the generic (·) (E) Γ preserved the admissibility of all epistemic inference rules. Unfortunately that allows counter-examples to the preservation of the necessitation rule, as shown in Section 2 by means of an algebraic counter-model 4 . Thus, to optain a successful proof, we define in Section 3 a more structured application of induction which is not based on preservation of the necessitation rule and succeeds in proving soundness in the propositional case.
Inadmissibility of the necessitation rule
If we were to prove Th. 1 above by a plain induction on length of derivation, then, according to a standard procedure, we would expect that, for any finite Γ ⊆ L IP and any E ∈ Γ, the translation (·) (E) Γ would transform any EP-primitive inference rule into an IP-admissible inference rule. It can be easily proved for all EP-primitive rules but for the -introduction rule (denoted by I):
if all open assumptions are of the form B.
In fact, there is at least one counter-example to the admissibility of every ( I)
in IP, as we show now.
Theorem 2. Let B and C be arbitrary atomic formulae (including ⊥) and let E be a propositional letter distinct from B and C; moreover, let Γ = {C, E}. If A = (E → B), then
is an IP-theorem. Let us then prove that, in contrast, ( A)
), thanks to Lemma 1.6/(v) of [2] and the ∧-elimination rule it suffices to prove that
is not intuitionistically valid, namely:
thanks to the soundness of IP wrt. the algebraic semantics, we obtain the result. In fact, let H = (H, ≤) be a totally-ordered Heyting algebra 5 (i.e. a chain) such that b, c, e ∈ H and 0 ≤ b ≤ c < e < 1. Now, let v be a valuation in H (i.e. a function from the set of propositional letters to H) such that, denoting by v H the standard extension of v to the IP-formulae w.r.t. H, we obtain v H (B) = b, v H (C) = c, and v(E) = e. Then
Hence
A non-trivial proof of soundness
We shall propose a new, explicit proof for Th. 1, with a focus on the treatment of the necesitation rule.
Proof 2. Let δ be an EP -derivation, in one arbitrary step of which a formula A is asserted under the assumptions A 1 , . . . , A n . Also, let Γ be an arbitrary finite set of IP-formulae. We suppose, as induction hypothesis, that for each C ∈ Γ the asserted formula in any previous step of δ, once translated w.r.t. C and Γ, is provable in IP from the translations of the open assumptions concerning that step of δ.
Consider the case that the assertion of A is obtained-through the I rule-from an earlier step of δ. Let then B 1 , . . . , B n , B be such that A 1 = B 1 , . . . , A n = B, A = B. We claim that, for any E ∈ Γ,
To prove it, thanks to Lemma 1.6/ iv of [2] it suffices to prove, by fixing an arbitrary formula
is provable from the above-mentioned assumptions. By the induction hypothesis we have (let us omit Γ from now on)
from which, by Lemma 1.6/(vii) we obtain:
Now, for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by Lemma 1.6/(i), (vii) we have the following:
Finally, by composition we get to:
